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We propose a method for event studies based on synthetic portfolios that provides a robust data-driven 
approach to build a credible counterfactual. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of volatility 
auctions using intraday data from the Colombian Stock Exchange. The results indicate that the synthetic 
portfolio method provides an accurate way to build a credible counterfactual that approximates the behavior 
of the asset if the auction had not taken place. The main results indicate that the volatility auction mitigates 
the volatility of the asset, but its effect on liquidity and trading activity is ambiguous at best. 
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1. Introduction  
Firm-specific trading halts are widely used in securities markets as a means of normalizing the trading 
process in times of excessive volatility. They belong to the group of circuit breakers that also includes price 
limits and market-wide trading halts (Kim and Yang 2004). Firm-specific trading halts are a common 
feature of stock exchanges around the world, such as the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Euronext, and those of 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, the UK, and Spain. However, there is no consensus on the 
need for or the effectiveness of trading halts. Moreover, interest in trading halts and price limits have 
rekindled in the aftermath of the Flash Crash in US futures and stock markets in May, 6, 2010 (Gomber, 
Lutat, Haferkorn, and Zimmermann 2011; Subrahmanyam, 2013; Dalko, 2016) .  
In principle, trading halts would be irrelevant in an efficient market because prices should respond 
immediately to the arrival of new information. However, market microstructure considerations might make 
them desirable. Specifically, trading halts have been justified as a way of mitigating the information 
disadvantage of uninformed traders or designated market makers, enabling the market to better 
accommodate large-volume shocks (Greenwald and Stein, 1988, 1991). Trading halts might also provide a 
“cooling off” period that supposedly allows investors to better process the incoming information (Kim, 
Yage and Yang, 2008). Theoretical models support this line of reasoning. Madhavan (1992), modeling a 
continuous market versus call auctions, finds that “the periodic auction aggregates information efficiently 
and is more robust to problems of information asymmetry in that it can operate where the continuous market 
fails” (p. 609). Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2002) offer a model in which trading halts signal large 
information asymmetry affecting not only the halted stock, but also informationally related securities. 
However, some academics oppose trading halts as undesired intrusions into a free market. Fama (1989) is 
against the “cooling off” period, arguing that any investors who want to cool off can do so by simply staying 
out of the market. Grossman (1990) states that investors, as “consenting adults”, should not be prevented 
from trading as they please. Grundy and McNichols (1989) propose a model of “learning through trading” 
that implies that in the absence of continuous trading potential traders are less able or willing to reveal their 
demands and information. Moreover, the theoretical analysis of Subrahmanyam (1994) finds that trading 
halts might have the perverse effect of exacerbating volatility because traders might sub-optimally advance 
their trades in anticipation. 
We study the effect on market quality of a particular type of trading halt on the Colombian Stock Exchange 
(BVC): the rules-based volatility auction. As detailed below, volatility auctions on the BVC are trading 
halts triggered by the imminence of a trade outside price collars, switching continuous trading to a short-
lived call auction. Like those of the Spanish Stock Exchange (SIBE) after May 2001, trading halts on the 
BVC display two fundamental differences from those on the NYSE, NASDAQ, Montreal Exchange (MX), 
and Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). First, trading halts on the BVC are not subjectively imposed by a 
regulator, or requested by the firm in question, but rather are automatically activated by the trading system 
when the price of a forthcoming trade lies outside the established trading range. Second, trading is not 
completely halted, but rather switched to a short-lived call auction (lasting for 2–3 minutes), wherein 
investors can incorporate their preferences and information by posting limit orders. Thus, price discovery 
can still take place in an organized fashion. 
 
This type of trading halt is also used in the Xetra trading system owned by the Deutsche Börse, where it 
goes under the name of “volatility interruptions.” These are regarded as a way of dealing with volatility 
spikes while allowing for smooth price discovery. In the words of the Deutsche Börse CEO, “The auction 
concentrates liquidity, and the message that is sent to all market participants attracts further liquidity. This 
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increase in liquidity in and of itself improves the price discovery process” (Francioni, 2013 p. 27). They 
can also be found in the stock markets of Paris and Euronext (Reboredo, 2012). 
Most of the previous literature have focused on information related trading halts. The evidence on their 
effectiveness is mixed. Motivated by the October 1987 crash, Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994) report that 
trading halts on the NYSE are associated with subsequent increased trading activity and volatility. Christie, 
Corwin, and Harris (2002) study information dissemination in relation to NASDAQ trading halts of varying 
durations. They find increased volatility, volume, and bid–ask spreads after five-minute halts, but not after 
overnight halts. They interpret this as evidence of the importance of increased information transmission 
during the halt. Corwin and Lipson (2000), who also study NYSE trading halts, report increased trading 
activity and volatility and reduced liquidity after the halt. However, they also find two desirable 
consequences. First, traders take advantage of the halt to revise their trading intentions by cancelling and 
submitting orders. Second, the clearing price at which trading resumes after the halt is informative of the 
future price. 
The evidence on international markets on information related trading halts is also mixed. Studying 
exchange-imposed halts, Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998) report increased volatility and volume on the 
MX. Frino, Lecce, and Segara (2011) find larger bid–ask spreads and reduced depth on the ASX. Studies 
focusing on the SIBE deal with two types of trading halts. Until May 2001, firm-specific trading halts were 
imposed by exchange officials when they were deemed necessary by price instability or incoming news, 
similar to the practice in the US, Canada, and Australia. From May 2001 onwards, trading halts were 
replaced by rules-based volatility auctions triggered by prespecified price collars. Studying data relating to 
trading halts up to April 2001, Kim, Yage, and Yang (2008) find an overall beneficial effect: trading activity 
increases and the bid–ask spread is narrower, although volatility remains the same. 
The evidence on volatility auctions is somewhat more favorable. Studying the SIBE volatility auctions, 
Reboredo (2012) finds improved price formation and a reduction in volatility, particularly for thinly traded 
stocks. Abad and Pascual (2010), also studying the SIBE, find increased volatility, volume, and information 
asymmetry, but acknowledge the lack of a proper counterfactual. Gomber, Lutat, Haferkorn, and 
Zimmermann (2011) study the effect of volatility auctions on the German Xetra stock market, as well as a 
satellite market, the London-based Chi-X MTF. They find a decline in stock volatility in both markets at 
the expense of increasing bid–ask spreads. Moreover, market quality and price discovery in the satellite 
market decreases during the volatility auction. Zimmermann (2013), also focusing on the Zetra market, 
studies 1,800 volatility auctions using Corwin and Lipson’s (2000) methodology and finds that volatility 
auctions improve price discovery to a degree similar to that of the Xetra midday auctions. He also reports 
benefits in terms of market quality using the midday auctions as a control group, revealed in the form of a 
decrease in volatility and the proportional bid–ask spread following the volatility auction. 
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, to our knowledge this is the first paper to study the effect 
of volatility auctions on the market quality of an emerging market1. The study of market microstructure 
                                                            
1 Two types of related market microstructure studies in emerging markets are worth to mention. First, Agarwalla, 
Jacob and Pandey (2015) and Gerace, Liu, Tian and Zheng (2015) investigate the role of opening call auctions on 
price discovery in the National Stock Exchange of India and Shangai Stock Exchange, respectively. Comerton-Forde 
(1999), in turn, compares the continuous opening in Jakarta Stock Exchange with the opening call auction of ASX.  
Second, there is a number of papers studying price limits in emerging markets, for the entire market as well as for 
specific stocks. Price limits are imposed by regulators, restricting trading prices to restrain excessive volatility. 
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design in emerging markets helps to better understand the price formation, volatility and liquidity in those 
venues and suggest alternatives in trading mechanisms and institutions design that improve it. Bekaert and 
Harvey (2002) remark the special challenges that market microstructure pose for emerging markets, 
emphasizing that many of those, at that time, were struggling about the right market design and institutions 
that improve price formation.  Issues of thin trading, excessive volatility, and insider trading are pervasive 
in emerging stock markets, occasionally leading to market failure and limiting their development over time. 
Those problems are likely to be compounded in a small emerging market such as Colombia. Since trading 
halts have been justified as a way to reduce information asymmetry, protect uninformed investors, and 
mitigate excessive volatility, a stock market such as the BVC is an ideal case study. 
Second, this paper presents a methodological contribution to the study of market microstructure events. We 
use a synthetic portfolio as a contemporaneous counterfactual for the stock affected by the volatility auction. 
As described in Section 3, we estimate this in a pre-event period, as the portfolio of stocks not involved in 
a trading halt. Thus, we compare the change in the variable of interest (volatility, spreads, or trading 
activity) for the halted stock, following the event, with the change in the same variable for the synthetic 
portfolio. The synthetic portfolio methodology is adapted from existing methods for causal inference in 
applied microeconomics (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmuller, 2010), but to the best of our knowledge it has 
not been used in intraday market event studies2. These quasi-experimental methods are starting to attract 
interest in finance and accounting research (Gow, Larcker and Reiss, 2016). The main reason is that 
although finance and accounting research addresses questions that are causal in nature, the methodologies 
that have been used for a long time, such as event studies, have yet to include methodological advances in 
causal inference that have been developed in other disciplines. 
Stock matching is the most widely used approach in these types of studies. For example, Jian, McInish, and 
Upson (2009) study firm-specific trading halts on the NYSE, pairing each halted stock with an 
informationally related stock in the same four-digit SIC industry, and with close correlation of returns, 
volume, volatility, and adverse selection component of the spread. However, this methodology is clearly 
unsuitable for a small stock market. Further, the pseudo-matching methodology of Lee, Ready, and Seguin 
(1994) pairs the period of the trading halt with a different trading period for the same stock. However, this 
approach omits any systematic effect on market quality variables around the trading halt. We suggest that 
the methodology proposed here can overcome the limitations of these approaches, particularly in the context 
of a small stock market, by taking advantage of the availability of high-frequency data and new research 
design methods. The two studies most closely related to the present one are those of Gomber et al. (2011) 
and Zimmerman (2013) on the German Xetra stock market. However, our study differs not only in relation 
to the sample data, but also in terms of the methodological approach. Zimmermann (2013) does not use 
stock matching, and Gomber et al. (2011) match the same stock at different times (midday auction). 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. The volatility auction has a statistically and quantitatively 
significant effect on attenuating price uncertainty once continuous trading recommences. In the absence of 
the call auction, the volatility of the affected stock, as proxied by the synthetic portfolio, would have been 
                                                            
Specifically those studies have been conducted in Taiwan Stock Exchange (Huang 1998; Huang, Fu, and Ke 2001; 
Kim 2001, Kim and Yang, 2004), Istambul Stock Exchange (Bildik and Gulay 2006), Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(Chan, Kim and Rhee, 2005), the National Stock Exchange of India (Nath 2005) and the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
(Farag 2016).  Both types of studies reflect the importance in the context of emerging markets of studying trading 
mechanisms to reduce volatility and improve price discovery.   




significantly higher. Further, the increasing volatility in the synthetic portfolio after the auction suggests 
that systematic volatility plays an important role in the triggering of volatility auctions. Conversely, using 
the weights estimated from the synthetic portfolio, we find no evidence that the auction has a significant 
effect on other dimensions of market quality such as liquidity, depth, or trading activity. Overall, the 
synthetic portfolio provides a simple yet accurate strategy to proxy the behavior of the asset had the auction 
not taken place. Furthermore, the volatility auction on the BVC, a type of rules-based circuit breaker, seems 
to have the desired effect, which is to reduce volatility without affecting other measures of market quality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant institutional features of the 
BVC. Section 3 provides the hypothesis regarding the volatility auction mechanism. Section 4 presents the 
data. Section 5 presents the synthetic portfolio method and compares it to traditional event study approaches 
within the framework of causal inference methods. Section 6 discusses the empirical results of the intraday 
event studies. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Volatility auction 
In February 2009, the BVC launched a new electronic stock trading platform incorporating features such 
as volatility auctions. The purpose of these rules-based market interruptions is to give investors an 
opportunity to receive and react to market information, to form a price in an orderly manner, and hence to 
mitigate excess volatility. Specifically, a volatility auction for a stock is triggered at any time during the 
continuous market by an order that would lead to a transaction outside a predetermined price range. The 
price range is set around the closing price of the previous day, with a bandwidth in one of three sizes (6.5%, 
5.5%, and 4%). The bandwidth is determined quarterly as a function of the past volatility of the stock 
(Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1] 
As soon as the auction begins, outstanding orders are withdrawn from the book, except for the one that 
triggered the auction. The duration of the auction is on average two and a half minutes, with a 30-second 
period where the auction closes randomly. When the auction ends, the equilibrium price is calculated as 
that which maximizes trading volume. The price range is then recalculated around the equilibrium price. 
There is no maximum number of volatility auctions, and a new auction for the same stock can start as soon 
as another auction ends.  
 
3. Hypothesis 
We are not aware of any theoretical model specifically devoted to volatility auctions. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction, Greenwald and Stein (1988, 1991), Madhavan (1992), and Spiegel and 
Subrahmanyam (2002) show that trading halts facilitate price discovery and foster trading activity in an 
environment where asymmetric information leads to significant transaction price risk or market failure. The 
results from these theoretical models are aligned to the “cooling off” hypothesis. Since the mechanism is 
specifically designed to reduce volatility, our first hypothesis focuses on that outcome. 
Hypothesis 1: A volatility auction effectively reduces volatility. That is, volatility diminishes after the 
continuous market resumes compared with what it would have been if no auction had taken place.  
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In the call auction, orders are batched together and there is simultaneous execution at a single equilibrium 
price, which enables a better price discovery process than in the continuous market. The more accurate 
price mitigates the need for subsequent price adjustments (unless another call auction starts immediately 
after the first one), and in doing so avoids excessive volatility in the market. This has been an important 
argument in favor of opening and closing markets with call auctions (Pagano, Peng and Schwartz, 2013) 3. 
As noted in the introduction, the empirical evidence is mixed regarding circuit breakers (trading halts and 
volatility auctions), in particular regarding whether the interruptions are themselves a source of excessive 
price changes, as found in a number of studies (Kryzanowski and Nemiroff, 1998; Christie, Corwin and 
Harris, 2002; Kim, Yage and Yang, 2008; Abad and Pascual, 2010). These results cast some doubt over the 
usefulness of the mechanism. More recently, there has been renewed interest in the usefulness of the circuit 
breakers, especially as a result of the incremental use of algorithmic trading and the possibility of 
malfunctioning trading systems. For example, the European Securities Market Authority has called for 
additional evidence regarding the effectiveness of the mechanism (European Commission, 2010). As 
mentioned by Zimmermann (2013), one important challenge has been setting up a framework to determine 
the causal relationship between the volatility auction and the transaction price variability when the 
continuous market resumes after the volatility auction. This seems to be an important drawback to most of 
the existing methodological approaches to measuring the effectiveness of trading halts, but can be overcome 
by the methodology proposed in this study. 
 
Next, we further investigate the impact of volatility auctions on some of the other dimensions of market 
quality, namely, liquidity and trading activity. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A volatility auction improves other measures of market quality besides volatility. 
 
According to the theoretical model of Madhavan (1995), volatility auctions should improve subsequent 
liquidity (e.g. lower bid–ask spreads) by mitigating asymmetric information. Further, to the extent that 
volatility auctions increase the visibility of the stock, they might also increase the proportion of uninformed 
traders, leading to improved liquidity and increased trading activity, in line with classical informed trading 
models such as those of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Results supporting this theory have 
been found by Zimmermann (2013) in the German Xetra stock market. 
 
Alternatively, volatility auctions might impair liquidity, as reported by Gomber, Lutat, Haferkorn, and 
Zimmermann (2011) in relation to the Xetra stock market and Abad and Pascual (2010) in relation to the 
SIBE. This can be explained in two ways. First, according to the “learning through trading” models cited 
by Lee et al. (1994), the absence of trading prices during the call auction (or halt) might discourage potential 
traders from revealing their demands. These demands then manifest when continuous trading resumes, 
increasing trading volume, volatility, and bid–ask spreads. Second, market quality can decrease if the call 
                                                            
3 However, it is important to keep in mind the difference between volatility auctions, trading halts, and opening and 
closing call auctions. Trading halts, like volatility auctions, can happen at any moment during the continuous 
market; however, their duration can be a couple of minutes, the remainder of the day, or even more than one day. In 
contrast, opening and closing call auctions have predefined start and end times. 
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auction does not last long enough for proper information dissemination prior to the reopening of the 
continuous market. This hypothesis was empirically tested by Christie et al. (2002), who found that short 
halts of only five minutes were followed by higher volatility and larger spreads, while 90-minute halts were 
not. 
 
4. Data and sample selection 
We use trade and quote (TAQ) data for 41 listed stocks on the BVC from August 2010 to August 2012. We 
obtain the TAQ data from Bloomberg Professional, online subscription service. The data contain bid and 
ask quotes, trades, and volumes. From a private database of BVC we obtain  time stamps signifying the 
beginning and end of volatility auctions on specific stocks. These can start at any time during the trading 
day, and there is no particular time of day when most auctions take place (see Figure 2). In total, there are 
1062 volatility auctions, about 90% of which are concentrated on 19 stocks. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
We define sample selection criteria to avoid confounding effects from different sources that can lead to a 
biased measure and to ensure enough information available from a trading day to test our hypotheses. For 
example, we avoid volatility auctions that take place near the opening of the trading day (commencing at 
8:30 for half of the year and at 9:30 for the other half) and closing five-minute auction (commencing at 
14:55 for half of the year and 13:55 for the other half). Thus we avoid the intrusion of other market 
mechanisms such as the closing call auction. Avoiding auctions near the opening of the market also ensures 
that we have sufficient data for estimation in the pre-event window. 
We start by defining the asset space in the market, which comprises a total of 𝐽𝐽 securities that are sufficiently 
liquid to be traded continuously throughout the day (𝑆𝑆1, 𝑆𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽). We identify the time and day of the 
volatility auction affecting security 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, and without loss of generality we define 𝑖𝑖 = 1. This means that 
trading for security 1 has been switched to a volatility auction. During the same period, there is a set of 
other securities 𝒮𝒮 = ( 𝑆𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽) still traded in a continuous market. 
We apply the following criteria to determine whether the auction for security 1 is retained in the selected 
sample: a) discard consecutive volatility auctions affecting the same security 𝑆𝑆1 within the same day4; b) 
verify that the volatility auction was not triggered at the beginning or the end of the daily trading session as 
defined above; c) verify that security 1 has sufficient trading activity during the day. In addition, we must 
ensure that securities in the control group, 𝒮𝒮, have sufficient trading activity during the day, and that none 
of those securities are affected by a volatility auction on the same day. 
Applying these selection criteria to the transaction (quote) data, the number of auctions in the sample falls 
to 184 (441), i.e. 17% (42%), of the original sample of 1062 auctions. 
Even though a significant number of observations is lost through this sample selection procedure, the 
reduced sample is still representative of the auctions taking place at different times of the trading day (see 
Figure 3). We perform the analyses to test our hypotheses using trade data and quote data separately. For 
example, we measure volatility from returns using transaction price or mid-price data. 
The volatility auction mechanism is designed to address strong price movements in a particular stock rather 
market wide effects. Although, this is the intention is important to determine if such interruption occurs 
                                                            
4 There are only a few cases (7) of consecutive volatility auctions on the same stock.  
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simultaneously across stocks.  To verify the possible existence of multiple auctions across different stocks 
occurring at approximately the same time, we count the number of auctions that occurred within a time 
interval in the sample. Figure 3 provide the distribution of the number of volatility auctions that occur 
within a day, within 1 hour or 30, 10, 5 and 1 minute. We expect that the number of auctions will be fewer 
as the time interval is smaller. At the day frequency, there are some outliers, for example, 28 volatility 
auctions affect the same number of stocks in one day, but the median is about two auctions per trading day. 
For a time interval of under 1 hour, we observe that there is only one volatility auction per interval with 
very few exceptions that we exclude using our sample selection criteria.  ( Carlos, esto es después de 
depurar? )  
[Insert Figure 3] 
We provide an initial assessment of the impact of volatility auctions on market quality by analyzing changes 
before and after for the variables of interest (volatility, liquidity and trading activity) in the cross section of 
available auctions. Table 1 presents the medians of the variables of interest for the stock affected by the 
auction (treated), the average effect on the stocks that make-up the control group and the market5. In the 
third column, we test the significance of the difference between the measures before and after the auction6.  
With respect to volatility, there is a significant change after the auction but we obtain mixed results, 
measured with trades volatility actually increases, whereas with mid-prices the mechanism seems to be 
performing, as it should. The change in the controls is non-existent and in the market, it is at best very 
small. With respect to the other market quality variables (liquidity and trading activity), we find no 
significant change around the auction. The last panel in the table summarizes the results of individual tests 
performed on each of the auctions. We perform robust two-sample test based on the difference or the ratio 
between the measures before and after the auction. The percentages indicate the number of auctions where 
we reject the null hypothesis that the measures are statistically different using the sample data before and 
after the auction. A higher percentage indicated that there are more auctions where the variables of interest 
change around the auction. The percentage tends to be higher in the treated variable than in the control or 
the overall market.    
[Insert Table 1] 
 
5. Synthetic portfolio method 
Event studies is one of the most widely used methodologies in accounting and financial research (Kothari 
and Warner, 2005), and in certain legal proceedings. The timeline structure of an event study has not 
changed dramatically since its introduction in the late sixties (Ball and Browm, 1968; Fama et al, 1969). 
There are important number of contributions that have focused specially on providing better tools for 
statistical inference, see Corrado (2011) for a recent discussion. A recurrent element in event studies is the 
use of the market model to estimate the so call “normal” returns.  In fact, Corrado (2011) argues that the 
popularity of event studies stems from a coincidence of developments in financial market research in the 
late 60’s: CAPM, the CRISP data and more sophisticated and accessible statistical software.   
                                                            
5 The market is represented by the intraday value of the COLCAP, the main index of BVC.  
6 As a standard practice in event studies, we introduce a gap between the time of the event and the estimation 
window and the post-event window. Specifically we ignore the data in intervals of five minutes around of the start 
and the end of the auction. 
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In traditional event studies (MacKinlay, 1997), the effect of a particular event on a stocks’s price is 
measured by the abnormal returns (ARs). For simplicity, suppose that stock 1 is the only security affected 
by an event, the abnormal return is: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸�𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡�𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡�,                𝑡𝑡 ∈ (𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇]      (1) 
where 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 is the actual return and 𝐸𝐸[𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡|𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡] is the expected normal return. There are two common choices 
for modeling the expected return: the constant mean return model and the market model. In both cases 
researchers use information in the pre-event window to quantify the normal return. In the constant mean 
return model, the normal return is the simple average of the variable of interest in the pre-event window. In 
the market model, the potential outcome is given by, �𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡�𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡� = ?̂?𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡, where 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the excess market 
return at time 𝑡𝑡 and ?̂?𝛽 is the estimated slope in the following regression, estimated with data in the pre-event 
window. 
𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  + 𝜖𝜖1,𝑡𝑡 .    (2) 
For the event study, we perform on the volatility auctions we follow a different approach that deviates from 
the use of the market model or the constant mean model to build the expected normal return. The main 
reason to deviate from the traditional approach is that we consider the expected return as a potential 
outcome. Taking that point of view, we try adapting existing methods in causal inference, in particular 
synthetic control methods (introduced by Abadie, Diamond and Hainmuller, 2010) to the problem at hand. 
The synthetic control method (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmuller, 2010), has received a lot of attention in 
comparative case studies on different subjects: terrorism, natural disasters, and tobacco control programs. 
As opposed to competing methods, synthetic control method's strength relies in the use of a combination of 
units to build a more objective comparison for the unit exposed to the intervention, rather than a choosing 
a single unit or an Ad hoc reference group. The authors advocate for the use of data drive procedures to 
build the reference group. The synthetic control method is a weighted average of the available control units, 
which makes explicit: the contribution of each unit to the counterfactual of interest and the similarities (or 
lack thereof) between the units affected by the event or the intervention of interest and the synthetic control 
in terms of the pre-intervention outcomes and other predictors of post-intervention outcomes. 
Synthetic matching techniques applied for event studies in finance are not common, we are only aware of 
their application in a recent paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani and Kwak (2016). In this paper, the authors 
measure the effect of personal connections on the returns of financial firms. The study is based on the 
connections of Timothy Geithner to different financial institutions prior to his nomination as Treasury 
Secretary at the end of 2008. The authors use a synthetic matching methodology to complement to the usual 
approach in event studies of capturing the difference between a treatment and control group using for the 
latter the fitted market model. 
We illustrate the synthetic matching methodology using an event study methodology with a synthetic 
portfolio as measure of the normal returns. The event of interest is the volatility auction, and our purpose 
is to determine the causal effect of such a market mechanism on market quality variables after continuous 
trading is resumed. 
We denote 𝑡𝑡 as the intraday time (1 < 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇) and 𝑇𝑇0 as the time when the auction takes place. Although, 
the auction lasts for approximately two and a half minutes, for notational simplicity we denote this interval 
as a particular moment in time, 𝑇𝑇0. The pre-event or estimation window is defined by 𝑡𝑡 ∈  [1,𝑇𝑇0), and the 
post-event or forecast window is defined by 𝑡𝑡 ∈  [𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇). The main challenge in determining the causal 
effect of the volatility auction (the intervention) on a given stock is the construction of a potential outcome 
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or counterfactual. This tries to capture what would have happened to the stock return had the volatility 
auction not taken place. 
The available data is intra-day data of the securities of interest 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  for stock 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽 and, 𝑡𝑡 =
1, … ,𝑇𝑇  where  𝑇𝑇0 < 𝑇𝑇. Suppose that stock 1 is the only one affected by the intervention, that is 𝑌𝑌1,𝑡𝑡 receives 
the treatment and the rest of the stock (𝑌𝑌2,𝑡𝑡 , … . ,𝑌𝑌𝐽𝐽,𝑡𝑡)are in the control group. Let 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁   (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼   ) denote the 
outcome that would be (is) observed for stock 𝑖𝑖 if the volatility auction had not taken (takes) place at 
time,𝑇𝑇0. Note that 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁    is a latent variable and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼  is the observed outcome for the variable of interest after 
the intervention (𝑇𝑇0 < 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇). 
In our application and similar to traditional event studies, the variable of interest is stock returns (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≔
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡). Therefore, 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 is the return of the stock whose trading has been halted because of the volatility auction 
(the stock that has been treated). Conversely, the synthetic portfolio is built using the other securities (those 
in continuous trading before and after the intervention) to replicate the performance of the security of 
interest. 
The methodology is very simple because we only need to obtain the portfolio weights 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗∗ by solving the 
optimal tracking problem, 









for the estimation window ∈ [1,𝑇𝑇0) . The optimization is constrained because weights must sum to 
one�∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=2 = 1�.  It is possible to include in this optimization problem additional restrictions on the 
estimated weights, for example non-negativity constraints7. 
A proper tracking of the stock of interest would guarantee that the synthetic portfolio could provide a 
potential outcome for the latent variable 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁  in the post event window (𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇]8.      
The effect of the intervention is equivalent to the abnormal returns of the asset of interest, 
𝛼𝛼�1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 = 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 −�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗∗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=2
𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 , 𝑡𝑡 ∈ (𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇] .      (6) 
As indicated previously, traditional economic and financial event studies provides two approaches to 
quantify the latent return 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 usually denoted as the normal return. The intent is to capture the usual behavior 
or the return in the absence of the intervention; the approaches are the constant mean return model or the 
market model. It is possible think of both approaches in a more general framework. The first approach only 
considers lagged time-series information from the stock on the return of interest in the estimation window 
(𝐴𝐴1,1, … .𝐴𝐴1,𝑇𝑇0−1) to estimate, 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁 . Lagged time series information with equal weights assigned to all 
observations is the usual approach known as the constant mean return model. It is also possible to use a 
different weighting to come up with a different version of the estimate for  𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 ; for example it would be 
                                                            
7 Later we compare the performance of the restricted (non-negative weights) and the unrestricted weights.  
8 The goodness of fit of the matching is determined by estimating the Mean Square Error in the estimation window or 
by testing that the cumulative abnormal returns are not statistically different form zero. 
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quite natural to assume that return follow a stationary AR(1) process and use the estimated coefficients (the 
first autocorrelation) to obtain the desired estimate of the potential outcome9.  The more popular approach 
is to use the market model or some other factor model (Fama-French three-factor or Carhart four factor 
model). This is actually very close to the original idea of a synthetic control (Abadie, et al. 2010), where 
the data generating process of 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 is determined by a factor model10. In finance factor models are used in 
many application, and although there is an extensive literature, there is also an important discussion on the 
validity of the factors used to explain the cross section of returns (Harvey, Liu and Zhu, 2015). 
Event studies in finance are observational studies rather than perfectly randomized experiments. In these 
types of studies, one way to strengthen the validity of the results is to guarantee that any decision on the 
research design is independent from the possible effects that such decisions may have on the conclusions 
of the study (Rubin, 2004). This implies that the methods preferably do not require strong assumption on 
the post event outcomes. The potential outcomes are generally considered as missing variables in the causal 
inference literature because it is not possible to observe all the instances of the variable of interest 
simultaneously. In many financial event studies, the researcher only observed the treated observation. 
Estimation of potential outcomes in observational studies uses one of the following techniques or a 
combination of some of them (Imbens and Rubin, 2015): model based-imputation, weighting, blocking and 
matching methods. In model-based imputation, the researcher builds a model in order to predict the missing 
potential outcome of unit that is not treated. This is exactly what traditional event studies do when they 
define the normal returns using the constant return model or the market model. Model based imputation is 
not recommended to estimate treatment effects because a proper fit can only be accomplished by specifying 
the post-event outcomes. Weighting and blocking use the propensity score to combine the information of 
the control units in order to build a proper counterfactual11. Using the propensity score achieves a balance 
between treated and control groups in order to estimate an unbiased treatment effect. Matching techniques 
find direct comparisons or matches for each unit. For a given treated unit with a particular value for the 
covariates, one searches for a control unit with similar values in the covariates. A distance metric is needed 
to implement a matching technique to assess the trade-off in choosing between different units and/or 
controls.       
The synthetic matching or synthetic portfolio approach can be considered an alternative way of defining a 
normal return model, which avoids strong assumptions on the effects of treatment or non-treatment. The 
synthetic portfolio method is very general, and does not require a natural experiment or ad hoc criteria to 
select the securities in the control group; therefore, researchers can use it in many types of event studies.  
One advantage of synthetic matching over traditional methods is the use of a different set of securities than 
the security of interest, the treated observation, that avoids any interference of the event on the potential 
outcome of interest. Under perfect circumstances, there is a well-defined control group. Off course, one 
must take care in avoiding any hidden variation that might spill over from the event to the control group12.  
                                                            
9 The AR(1) process can be justified on the basis of the effects of the bid-ask spread bouce on the price process, (Roll 
1984).  
10 Abadie et al. (2010) treat the potential outcome problem as a missing data one and therefore define a data generating 
process for the missing outcome. The choice is a factor model that includes observed covariates and unobserved 
components. Both elements are unit specific and are not time varying. The implementation of synthetic control 
methods for the present case is not straightforward because there are no unit specific controls relevant for the sampling 
frequency.  
11 The propensity score is the average unit assignment (for a particular treatment) probability for units that share the 
same specific characteristic. 
12 One could argue that the market model does also provide a way to avoid the used of the treated variable in the 
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The synthetic portfolio approach has an important difference with respect to synthetic control method: it 
has no covariates. Covariates are not used because the matching is based strictly on the ability of the 
combination the stocks in the control group to perform an adequate tracking of the treated stock in the 
estimation window. As mentioned previously the most natural way to introduce covariates in this context 
is to use a factor model13. This implies a trade-off between a model with tighter restriction on the matching 
of units with the use of covariates and a miss specification problem brought on by the model or the wrong 
covariates14. It is possible to use discrete value covariates (indicator functions that signal whether a stock 
belongs to a group of assets with similar characteristics), for example industry classification. However, this 
is equivalent to using industry indexes in the factor model rather than the market index. For the application 
to the volatility auctions, the number of feasible stock used to analyze each action is not enough to classify 
into industry portfolios or any other classification. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of how synthetic portfolio method works. The continuous line 
shows the observed evolution of returns for security 1 before and after the event, while the dash line shows 
the evolution of the synthetic portfolio. Note that in the pre-event window, the synthetic portfolio performs 
well in tracking the performance of security 1, as it clearly replicates the return on the security of interest15. 
Thus, we have a strong proxy for security 1 just before the volatility auction. Once the volatility auction is 
complete and a new equilibrium price is obtained, continuous trading resumes in the post-event window 
and we see the evolution of the returns on security 1 that have been affected or treated by the volatility 
auction. Thus, the post-event return on the synthetic portfolio 𝐴𝐴P,𝑡𝑡 ≔ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗∗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=2 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 becomes a proxy for the 
unobserved potential outcome in relation to security 1 had the volatility auction not taken place (𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 ) , in 
other words the state in which security 1 is not exposed to the volatility auction (the treatment). We 
emphasize that none of the securities in the synthetic portfolio are affected by the volatility auction, and 
thus have received no treatment. It is important to note the effects of the sample selection criteria over the 
estimated effect of the intervention. That is, the effect of the sample selection criteria that we impose on the 
elements of the control group regarding the no inclusion of stocks that have a similar type of volatility 
auction over the trading day. The main reason to include this criterion is to avoid any interference in the 
measure by using a very strict condition on being part of the control group. However, this creates a 
censoring of the potential outcome because these stocks never have price paths that excess the limits defined 
by the mechanism. This implies that by censoring the potential outcome (the synthetic portfolio) we 
measure a lower bound for the effect with respect to the non-censored case. Therefore, the effect of the 
intervention measured in terms of the abnormal returns of stock 1 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡) is a conservative lower bound for 
the true uncensored effect. 
                                                            
construction of the potential outcome; this is true because one would expect that in a liquid and deep market the 
security of interest is only one of many constituents of the index. This is however not necessarily true for thinly traded 
markets where the index can be determined mostly by a handful of assets. For example, by early August 2010, four 
stocks of the twenty that constitute the COLCAP made up 56% of the index value. 
13 Unfortunately the most commonly used factor models in finance (Fama-French three-factor or Carhart four factor 
model) do not use unit specific covariates, which impedes the “off-the-shelf” use of synthetic control methods.  
14 For the time being, it is not clear how to find a good trade off in an estimator; Imbens (2015) provides a discussion 
and recommendations in a general context. 
15 It is possible to use several test to evaluate tracking performance in the estimation window, for example using the 
root mean square error or a test of hypothesis on the tracking error, which is actually equivalent to testing the 
cumulative abnormal returns. The null hypothesis of the test would be that the tracking error or the cumulative 
abnormal returns are equal to zero.  
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In order to map returns to volatility of stock 1 and the synthetic portfolio in the pre-event and port-event 
window, we obtain five-minute realized volatility and perform nonparametric two-sample scale test on the 
differences between these volatilities for each auction. These tests help us in determining: first, whether 
there is good tracking performance in the estimation window with respect to the variable of interest and 
that the estimated volatilities are equivalent (two-sided test). Second, whether the volatility auction 
mechanism is working, and the volatility of the non-treated (the synthetic portfolio) is significantly larger 
than the treated unit (stock 1), for this we use a one-sided test. We also follow the suggestion of Abadie, et 
al. (2010) and form a placebo test for the synthetic matching. The purpose of the placebo test is to randomize 
treatment within the units of analysis (stock 1 and the stocks in the control group) that are trading at the 
same time. This exercise allows us to determine whether the estimated effect of the volatility auction (on 
stock 1) is large relative to the distribution of the effects estimated on for the stocks in the control group 
that are not exposed to the interruption. We perform these last tests in the post-event window. 
We use the weights of the synthetic portfolio, to build synthetic indicators of the other variables of interest 
(bid–ask spreads, depth, and turnover). We can generalize the previous measure of abnormal returns to a 
measure of the effects of a volatility auction on any of the variables that are informative with respect to 
market quality: 
𝛿𝛿1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌1,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑌𝑌Ρ,𝑡𝑡 
 = 𝑌𝑌1,𝑡𝑡 −�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗∗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=2
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡               𝑡𝑡 ∈ (𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇].      (4) 
Since most of the indicators of market quality have a strictly positive support, we use weights of the 
synthetic portfolio returns based on the restricted estimator (weights are non-negative, 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗∗ ≥ 0). We do not 
perform a separate matching procedure for each variable, because we do not have a large number of assets 
in the control group and hence imposing non-negativity constraint on the weights usually leads to selecting 
one of the stocks. When the methodology only select one of the stocks, the tracking performance is very 
poor and hence we rather use the weights obtained from tracking returns. 
We also perform hypothesis test on the pre-event and post-event outcomes of the other variables of interest 
(bid–ask spread, turnover). For all of the variables  and the results that we present in the following sections 
we only use volatility auctions where there is good tracking performance (in the estimation window) based 
on these test strategies to determine the effectiveness of the mechanism and its effect on market quality.  
 
6. Empirical analysis 
a. The synthetic portfolio  
For each of the auctions, our empirical strategy requires us to build a synthetic portfolio that provides an 
accurate tracking performance of the asset of interest before the auction. We then use this portfolio to trace 
the potential outcome (in the post-event window) for the same asset had the auction not taken place. 
We illustrate the method by selecting two auctions (see Figure 5). The first auction took place on 16 
November, 2010 at 11:50:39, and related to the stock of an oil and gas company (ticker: ECOPETL). The 
second auction took place on 9 August, 2011 at 12:25:43, and related to the stock of a commercial bank 
(ticker: PFBCOLO). In both cases, the top panel shows how the restricted (dashed line) and the unrestricted 
synthetic portfolio (dotted line) is able to track the five-minute returns of the stock during the estimation 
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window. The vertical line indicates the beginning and end of the auction16. After the auction has ended, the 
post-event window shows the deviation between the observed returns (the treated case) of the asset and the 
returns of the synthetic portfolio acting as the potential outcome (non-treated case). In the post-event 
window, the variation between the returns of the synthetic portfolio and the observed returns in both stocks 
is expected to be significant because the counterfactual is designed to capture an unobserved state wherein 
the auction did not take place.  
[Insert Figure 5] 
One advantage of using intraday data is that, compared with daily data, there is less chance of introducing 
a confounding effects unrelated to the volatility auction. Furthermore, the construction of the counterfactual 
using a synthetic portfolio is more robust. Compared with other approaches used in comparative case 
studies, we are not choosing one particular asset or reference group of assets to build the counterfactual, 
but rather we are using an optimal set of weights to replicate the asset of interest using a control group that 
has not been affected by the auction. Although there are bound to be some externalities from informationally 
related securities, as identified by Jian, McInish, and Upson (2009), our approach is a less biased alternative 
because the weights are estimated rather than imposed. The bottom panels in Figure 5 show the estimated 
weights that are used to build the synthetic portfolio in the two auctions, for both the restricted (𝑤𝑤 >= 0) 
and the unrestricted case (𝑤𝑤 free). Each asset in the control group receives a positive or negative weight. 
The asset does not necessarily belong to a specific asset class that has similar characteristics to the asset 
affected by the auction. For example, in some comparative case studies, Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007, the 
authors build the control group by choosing companies in the same sector. The synthetic portfolio is only 
built on the notion that a particular asset in the control group (not treated by the volatility auction) provides 
a contribution to tracking the asset of interest (the stock that will be affected by the volatility auction) before 
the realization of the event of interest (the volatility auction). 
In table 2, we look at the performance of synthetic portfolio in both the estimation as well as the post-event 
window.  In the top left panel we compare the performance of the synthetic portfolio method against the 
traditional event study methods (time series or market model approach) using the root mean square error 
(RMSE) between the observed and the estimated returns along the estimation window. We find that the 
synthetic portfolio does not provide a better alternative when trying to fit the returns of the asset of interest, 
all the more when using unrestricted weights. However, we are not interested in testing cumulative 
abnormal returns, which is equivalent to looking at the RMSE, rather we are interested in testing the 
difference between the volatilities of the treated unit and the synthetic portfolio in the estimation window. 
Good tracking performance will guarantee a replication of the volatility by the synthetic portfolio with 
respect to the treated unit. In the top right panel, we provide the percentage of auctions where we can reject 
the null hypothesis that the volatilities are different between the volatility of the treated and the non-treated. 
The results indicate a slight advantage of synthetic control methods (less rejections) for the same set of 
auctions.   
In the two lower panels of Table 2, we look at the performance of synthetic portfolio in the post-event 
window. We use the placebo test proposed by Abadie et al. (2010) to look at the robustness of the results. 
The idea is that the estimated effect of non-treatment, in this case no auction, the volatility is larger in 
magnitude than in the case where there is a randomized treatment over the control units and the treatment 
unit (including it in the portfolio).  The results indicate the percentage of auctions where the volatility of 
the synthetic after the auction is above the 95th percentile of the placebo distribution. If this is so then the 
                                                            
16 The information provided during the auction is not considered in the pre- or post-event windows, we also use a 5-
minute gap before the auction starts and after the auction ends. 
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magnitude of the effect is well above the randomization of the treatments over all units.  The percentage of 
auctions that overcome the placebo test is 36 to 42% of the auctions analyzed. Imposing non-negativity 
contains in the weights creates a significant reduction in auctions that pass the placebo-test and hence we 
concentrate on the results for the unrestricted case but making sure that the matching is adequate for 
volatility in the estimation window. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
b. Impact of volatility auctions on volatility  
To assess the impact of the volatility auction on volatility, following the methodology outlined in the 
previous section, we estimate five-minute realized volatilities for the treated stock and for the non-treated 
control (the synthetic portfolio) both before and after the auction. We are only using auctions where the 
synthetic portfolio has a good tracking performance of the asset of interest in the pre-event window; we try 
to confirm that the volatility before the auction is of the same magnitude. If hypothesis 1 is correct and the 
volatility auction avoids large price variations, the asset that has gone into the auction (treated) displays 
lower volatility than the potential outcome captured by the synthetic (non-treated) portfolio, after the 
auction. In figure 6, we capture the average effect using the cross section of volatilities for the auctions. 
There are two panels in every figure. The left panel is a scatter plot of the treated and non-treated units 
before the auction. A black dashed line represents the case where the volatility of the non-treated is exactly 
equal to the volatility of the treated. In other words, the line has a zero intercept and a slope exactly equal 
to one. The blue solid line represents the estimated OLS fitting line and the gray area the corresponding 
95th confidence interval. A perfect matching before the auction would require that the solid line coincides 
with the dashed line on that the intercept and the slope of the estimated solid is statistically equal to zero 
and one, respectively. This is not the case in any of the right panels17, but in general the matching is close 
enough and the dashed line is mainly within or close to the gray area. This is the best match we can 
accomplish given that we are already using the subset of auctions where we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the estimated realized volatilities are equivalent before the auction.  
In the right panel of each figure, we use the same auctions and present the observed volatility of the treated 
unit after the auction and the volatility of the synthetic portfolio using the estimated weights and the 
observed return process for the stocks belonging to the control group (no treatment). This is our estimate 
of what would have happened to the volatility had the auction not taken place. The estimated line based on 
these set of points will give us a rough estimate of the average effect of the volatility auction mechanism. 
In particular, we look at the difference between the intercept of both blue solid curves before and after the 
auction as the measure of the effect of the volatility auction. This measure is between 3% and 6% less 
volatility in the stocks subject to volatility auctions, in other words this is 10 to 25 times larger than what 
we see in the average data before and after the auction (Table 1). 
Alternatively, in Table 3 we look at the difference in the medians and perform a two-sample Wilcoxon test 
on the data points for the treated and non-treated units the magnitudes are similar, between 1.2% and 8% 
(second column of Table 3). Using the data just one hour after the auction the magnitude is smaller, that is 
                                                            
17 The matching is not perfect for many reasons, for example measurement error; however, it is possible that one 
will want to avoid a perfect matching because this could lead to overfitting. That is the solution might be somewhere 
in between under and over fitting.   
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around 1.5% less volatility and with the difference in the medians is much smaller 0.1%, but statistically 
significant.  
[Insert Figure 6] 
Looking at the plots in Figure 6, the top and bottom panels differ in terms of the information used to estimate 
the returns and volatilities, i.e. transaction prices versus mid-prices. The right and left panels differ in terms 
of the amount of five-minute returns used to estimate the realized volatilities. In the left panels, all of the 
information in both the pre- and post-event windows is used18. In the right panels, we only consider five-
minute returns for one hour before and after the auction. In three out of four panels in Figure 6, we observe 
that the volatility auction delivers a reduction in volatility, which is in line with the results for the German 
Xetra stock market (Gombet et al., 2011; Zimmerman, 2013) and Spanish stock market (Reboredo, 2010)19. 
From the results of table 3, in general we find that the volatility of the treated stock after the auction has 
significantly decreased whereas the volatility of the non-treated increased or does not change. Only in one 
case, volatility based on trades using all available data, we find that the volatility is increasing in both the 
treated and the non-treated synthetic, but the last one in a greater amount (more than twice). Because we 
are not exploring the specific causes of the increase in volatility that triggered the auction, our conclusions 
on the performance of the volatility auction mechanism assume that it mitigates volatility spikes in 
individual stocks (by a reduction or bounding) and not in the overall market. The additional evidence 
presented in figure 3 regarding the low occurrence of multiple auctions does not indicate that the auctions 
are triggered by systemic effects in the market. However, it´s still plausible that a peak in the market 
volatility will only affect one stock with a combination of high beta and high idiosyncratic volatility relative 
to the predefined price range20.    
[Insert Table 3] 
 
c. Impact of volatility auctions on liquidity  
Similar to volatility, we measure the effect of volatility auctions on other variables of market quality for 
both treated stocks and the corresponding synthetic portfolios. Figure 7 shows the change in the bid–ask 
spread for the two groups. The top graphs show the results for the effective bid–ask spread, while the bottom 
graphs show the results for the quoted bid–ask spread, both of which are defined in Goyenko, Holden, and 
Trzcinka (2009). As before, the left panels use all the available information on the trading day, while the 
right panels only use information from one hour before and after the call auction. It is apparent that the 
volatility auction does not have a significant effect on the bid–ask spread for the treated stock, as the circles 
are reasonably evenly distributed above and below the black line in all four cases. Interestingly, the liquidity 
measure seems to decrease after the call auction for the non-treated group, as the triangles tend to be below 
                                                            
18 Note that the amount of available information can differ because it depends on the time when the auction takes place 
during the trading day. 
19 We performed robustness tests based on one-minute and 10-minute returns and the results were equivalent with 
respect to the effectiveness of the mechanism, the only significant difference being that in some cases we had a smaller 
number of feasible auctions to analyze, and thus tracking performance declined at these frequencies. These results are 
available upon request to the authors. 
20 The difficulty lies in the fact that in order to disentangle systemic and idiosyncratic volatility we have to make strong 
assumption in the data generating process and in particular the effect on the potential outcome. This is however 




the black line in all four panels. These preliminary results clearly refute the hypothesis that volatility 
auctions improve the liquidity of the treated stocks. 
[Insert Figure 7] 
Table 3 also includes the median of the measures of liquidity and trading activity for both groups, before 
and after the auction. We include five liquidity measures: the quoted and effective spreads, the depths at 
both quotes, and the ratio of the bid–ask spread to average depth, as presented by Jiang et al. (2009). 
Focusing on the results within one hour after the auction (columns 3 and 4), there is a reduction in the 
quoted bid–ask spread in both groups, significant at the 5% level, and also in the spread/depth ratio. 
Moreover, there is a statistically significant reduction in the effective bid–ask spread in the control group, 
but not in the treated stock. This minor increase in liquidity in both the stock and the synthetic portfolio can 
be attributed to the well-known trend whereby liquidity improves during the trading day. In fact, the 
decrease is higher when we take all data available (columns 1 and 2).  In turn, there is a significant drop on 
the bid depth of the treated stock, but the opposite effect for the synthetic portfolio.  In terms of trading 
activity, measured by the turnover, there is no significant effect on either the stock undergoing the auction 
(treated) or the synthetic portfolio (non-treated). Overall, the results in Table 3 do not support hypothesis 
2. Thus, the volatility auction does not have a discernible effect on the market quality variables of the treated 
stock other than volatility itself. 
 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper, we address one of the main difficulties in event studies: building a credible counterfactual. 
Traditional event studies have focused on using the security of interest fitted to the market model 
(MacKinlay, 1997), building a reference group based on assets with similar characteristics or behavior 
(Jiang et al., 2009), or defining pseudo-events (Reboredo, 2010; Abad and Pascual, 2010). 
We suggest a different methodological approach by proposing a synthetic portfolio for event studies. This 
approach allows us to build a more general and robust counterfactual. Our counterfactual is the best tracking 
portfolio for the stock of interest, obtained as a weighted average of the returns on the stocks that have not 
been affected by the event. The methodology has enormous potential for overcoming some common 
problems in event studies, such as confounding effects and the fact that in small stock markets it is not easy 
to find enough stocks with a particular characteristic to build a control group. In addition, there are some 
obstacles to overcome in refining the methodology, for example, we do not explore the role of covariates 
that are widely accepted as very important for matching in causal inference. One possibility that we hope 
to explore in a follow-up paper, is that given the connection to portfolio optimization we can try to use 
parametric portfolio policies (Brandt, Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2009) to introduce covariates in the 
weights and explore the benefit of such strategies.  
We use the synthetic portfolio method to test the effectiveness of a type of circuit breaker known as a 
volatility auction. We use high-frequency TAQ data from the BVC, which uses this mechanism in its 
trading platform. 
Studying volatility auctions observed over a two-year period from 2010 to 2012, we find positive results in 
terms of the effectiveness of the mechanism, which has a significant impact in terms of mitigating excessive 
volatility during the trading day. In addition, we do not find any effect on other dimensions of market 
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Figure 3 Number of volatility auctions within a predefined time interval. 















Figure 5 Synthetic portfolio.  
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) illustrate the five-minute observed returns (solid line), synthetic returns with 
portfolio weights above or equal to zero (dashed line) and synthetic returns with unrestricted portfolio 
weights (dotted line) of ECOPETL and PFBCOLO over the trading day. We observed a call auction (the 
event) taking place at the time indicated by the red vertical line. The vertical line also determines the pre-
event/estimation window and the post-event/forecasting window. Panels (c) and (d) indicate the estimated 
weights of the synthetic portfolio for ECOPETL and PFBCOLO. These weights are estimated using the 








Figure 6 Impact of volatility auctions on volatility. 
Notes: Each panel illustrates two scatter plots of the estimated five-minute (daily) realized volatilities before 
(on the left) and after the volatility auctions (on the right). The elements in the scatter plot indicate the 
volatility of the asset that is affected by the auction (treated, x-axis) and the non-treated synthetic portfolio 
(y-axis). Blue triangles (red circles) indicate auctions where the post-event estimation of the volatility using 
the synthetic portfolio attain a value above (below) the 95th percentile of the distribution over the placebo 
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test. In each plot the dashed black line indicates the curve under which the volatility of the treated and the 
non-treated is exactly the same. The solid blue line is the OLS fitted line using the data points and the gray 
area is the 95th confidence interval around this line. If the estimated solid blue line is close to the dashed 
line before the auction then we assume that the matching is correct in the estimation window (before the 
auction). The solid blue lines estimated with the data points before and after the action give an idea of the 
effect of the volatility auctions on the non-treated (potential outcome), that is, a larger intercept after the 
auction (on the right) indicates the average volatility that would have been expected had the auction not 
taken place. In panels (a) and (b), the realized volatilities are estimated using five-minute returns based on 
mid-prices (quote data), whereas panels (c) and (d) provide estimated volatilities from trades. In panels (a) 
and (c), the realized volatilities before and after the auction are measured using the continuous trading 
information for the full day. In panels (b) and (d), the realized volatilities before and after the auction are 







Figure 7 Impact of volatility auctions on liquidity. 
 
Notes: Each panel illustrates two scatter plots of the average spread before (on the left) and after the 
volatility auctions (on the right). The elements in the scatter plot indicate the spread of the asset that is 
affected by the auction (treated) and the spread of the non-treated synthetic portfolio. In each plot the dashed 
black line indicates the curve under which the spread of the treated and the non-treated is exactly the same. 
The solid blue line is estimated using the data points and the gray area is the 95th confidence interval around 
this line. If the estimated solid blue line is close to the dashed line before the auction, then we assume that 
the matching is correct in the estimation window (before the auction). The estimated solid blue lines before 
and after the action provide a measure the effect of the volatility auctions on the non-treated (potential 
outcome), that is, a larger intercept after the auction indicates a wider average spread that would have been 
30 
 
expected had the auction not taken place. In panels (a) and (b), the spreads are measured using the effective 
spread based on transaction prices and quotes. In panels (c) and (d), the spreads are measured using bid and 
ask prices (quote data). In panels (a) and (c), the average spreads before and after the auction are measured 
using the continuous trading information for the full day. In panels (b) and (d), the average spreads before 
and after the auction are measured using the continuous trading information for only one hour before and 











Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the variables of interest before and after the volatility auction. 
Notes:  The tables contain the medians on the variables of interest using the information for the sample of feasible auctions using the trade and quote 
data. The table on the top used all the available information during the trading day before and after the auction, to compute the descriptive statistics. 
The table in the bottom only considers the available information up until one hour before and after the volatility auction. The first two panels contain 
the median measures of the variables of interest across all of the auctions before and after. Each of these set of columns has the information for the 
asset that is affected by the auction (treated), the average value for the controls (the assets that are trading at the same time but are not affected by 
the volatility auction) and the relevant market index (COLCAP). We use the cross section of actions to measure the difference between before and 
after the volatility auction (excluding a 5 minute interval before and after).  We use t-test and ratio test, to ascertain the statistical significance of the 
differences (*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively). In addition for each individual auction we test the null 
hypothesis that each of the variables of interest is statistically different before and after the auction.   In the last columns we report the percentage of 
auctions where we can reject the null hypothesis indicating that the variables are statistically equivalent before and after the volatility auctions.  No 
me queda claro. No tiene más sentido que la hipótesis nula sea de igualdad y la alternativa de reducción?  
Treated Controls Market Treated Controls Market Treated Controls Market Treated Controls Market
Average return Trades 0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.03%** 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.14
Average return Mid-Price 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%* 0.00%* 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.11
Volatility (daily) Trades 2.35% 0.41% 0.46% 2.60% 0.37% 0.46% 0.25%** 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.43 0.34
Volatility (daily) Mid-Price 2.77% 0.62% 0.57% 1.90% 0.86% 0.49% -0.88%*** 0.00 -0.08%*** 0.76 0.71 0.48
Quote Bid-Ask Spread 1.80% 3.22% 1.44% 2.50% 0.00 -0.72%*** 0.72 0.93
Efective Spread 0.81% 0.74% 0.72% 0.57% 0.00 -0.17%*** 0.61 0.81
Bid Depth 38.12 93.65 32.85 102.97 -5.27 9.33*** 0.77 0.74
Ask Depth 44.53 102.42 51.83 115.51 7.30 13.09*** 0.84 0.71
Spread Depth 0.04% 0.06% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01%*** -0.02%*** 0.74 0.80
Turnover 32.11 29.01 24.47 27.97 -7.64 -1.04 0.59 0.66
Treated Controls Market Treated Controls Market Treated Controls Market Treated Controls Market
Average return Trades 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.02%*** -0.01% 0.00% 0.10 0.13 0.09
Average return Mid-Price 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.33 0.09 0.08
Volatility (daily) Trades 2.54% 0.42% 0.50% 2.57% 0.41% 0.51% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01% 0.55 0.29 0.23
Volatility (daily) Mid-Price 1.69% 0.30% 0.51% 1.28% 0.28% 0.48% -0.41%** -0.02% -0.03%** 0.71 0.45 0.19
Quote Bid-Ask Spread 1.17% 2.97% 1.18% 2.80% 0.02% -0.17%*** 0.61 0.73
Efective Spread 0.64% 0.80% 0.68% 0.65% 0.03% -0.15%*** 0.46 0.81
Bid Depth 38.78 92.38 37.25 98.28 -1.53 5.90** 0.62 0.37
Ask Depth 49.54 101.98 49.37 108.41 -0.16 6.43* 0.58 0.43
Spread Depth 0.03% 0.06% 0.02% 0.05% 0.00% -0.01%*** 0.57 0.63
Turnover 30.45 29.47 24.38 29.70 -6.07 0.23 0.40 0.59
Information for all day of trading 
1 hour before and after auction
Before auction After auction Difference % of Auctions





Table 2 Performance of event method methodologies and synthetic matching. 
Note: The table on the top compares a series of measures of performance over the estimation window (in-sample fit) of synthetic matching with 
respect to traditional (model based imputation) event study methodologies. The first measure on the left is the root mean square error between the 
observed returns and the normal (using a univariate AR1 process or the market model-CAPM-) or synthetic portfolio with unrestricted or non-
negative weights.  The second measure on the right is based on a two-sample ratio test on the difference of scale parameters (Ansari-Bradley test) 
for each individual auction comparing the volatility of the treated and the synthetic portfolio in the estimation window. The table indicates the 
percentage of auctions where the null hypothesis is rejected. The table in the bottom is based on the placebo test in Abadie et al. (2010) based on 
synthetic matching in the post event window. The test is applied to the randomization of units between the treatment and control group in each 
auction. The tables indicate the percentage of auction where the estimated variance for the true treatment variable is above the 95th percentile of the 
placebo distribution.     
 
 
AR1 CAPM AR1 CAPM
Trades 0.0036 0.0036 0.0065 0.0039 61% 61% 55% 45%











Post Event Window Performance
% of Auctions where volatility is above the 95th percentile of the Placebo distribution
Until market close 1 hour after the event
Potential Outcome Model Synthetic Potential Outcome Model Synthetic 
% of Auctions where we reject 
Potential Outcome Model Synthetic Potential Outcome Model Synthetic 
Estimation Window Performance 
RMSE of Returns








Table 3 Impact on market quality of the volatility auction. 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Corregir “until” por “to the end of the trading day” o algo así.   Falta descripción  
 
 
Difference (After- Before) Treated Non-Treated Treated Non-Treated
Trades -observed 1.02%* 2.20%*** -0.01%** 0.01%
Mid Price -fundamental 0.00% 7.90%*** -0.04%*** 0.01%
Quote Bid-Ask Spread -0.70%*** -1.00%*** -0.01%** -0.01%***
Efective Spread -0.20% -0.30%*** 0.00% -0.00%***
Bid Depth -11.37*** 23.38*** -10.27*** 7.86*
Ask Depth 0.70 -2.08 2.05 -5.05
Spread Depth -0.01%* -0.02%*** -0.00%** -0.00%**
Trading Act. Turnover 3.60 0.66 0.51 -4.08
After auction we take all 
available data until 
After auction we take 
data 1h after de auction
Volatility
Liquidity
